Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military Law by Sherman, Edward F.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1971
Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military
Law
Edward F. Sherman
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Legislation Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sherman, Edward F., "Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military Law" (1971). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 2267.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2267
CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM OF MILITARY LAW
EDWARD F. SHERMAN*
The current political and constitutional controversy surround-
ing military justice has resulted in considerable legislative activ-
ity. In the following article, Professor Sherman compares the Bayh,
Bennett, Hatfield, Price, and Whalen proposed amendments to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and offers his assessment of the
need for change.
The present American military justice system is twenty years old
this year. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) was
passed by Congress in 19501 in response to complaints of ex-servicemen
and their families concerning the administration of military justice dur-
ing World War II. The U.C.M.J. removed the worst aspects of the
old disciplinary courts martial by introducing a number of civilian
court procedures and extending vast new procedural protections to
servicemen, but it was a product of compromise. The military had
strenuously opposed removing all the special characteristics of the tra-
ditional court-martial on the grounds that military discipline would
be adversely affected, and these arguments carried the day with Con-
gress. As a result, the U.C.M.J. merely remodeled the old court-martial
structure.
The most important feature of the traditional military justice structure
retained by the U.C.M.J. was "command control" of the court-martial.
Command control refers to the right of an individual commander to con-
vene a court-martial for trial of one of his men, to appoint all the person-
nel (including counsel and jury) from his officers, and to exert general
supervisory power over the entire proceedings from pre-trial investiga-
tion to post-sentence review. The court-martial machinery thus was left
in the hands of the commander, and it was expected that the court-
martial would serve his disciplinary objectives. As the Supreme Court
observed in a 1969 decision, "a court-martial is not yet an independent
instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part
of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved." 2
Reformers who had hoped to see military justice become a truly
A.B., 1959, Georgetown University; M.A., 1962, M.A., 1967, University of Texas at
El Paso; J.D., 1962, Harvard University. Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1 Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107, 10 U.S.C. S§ 801-940 (1964).
2 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
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judicial system providing servicemen fair and impartial trials free from
influence by the commander were from the start unhappy with the
U.C.M.J. Thus, the chairman of the War Veterans Bar Association
committee on military justice, Arthur E. Farmer, testified before the
passage of the U.C.M.J.:
The basic reform which the court-martial system requires and with-
out which no real reform is possible-the elimination of command
control from the courts-is conspicuously lacking. Under the Uni-
form Code the commanding general will still appoint the members
of the court, the trial counsel and the defense counsel from mem-
bers of his command, and will review the findings and sentence.
We will still have the same old story of a court and counsel, all of
whom are dependent upon the appointing and reviewing authority
for their efficiency ratings, their promotions, their duties, and their
leaves.3
More widespread dissatisfaction with the U.C.M.J. was quick in devel-
oping. The first report of the committee required to make an annual
assessment of the Code recommended 17 immediate changes.4 Remedial
bills were proposed throughout the 1950's," and a sweeping reform
bill0 was introduced in 1959 with the support of the American Legion
which stated that it had become obvious that the U.C.M.J. had not
removed the pall of command influence hanging over courts-martial.
Reform legislation finally passed as the Military Justice Act of 1968.'
It made valuable changes in court-martial procedures, removing some
of the most flagrant non-judicial aspects of the U.C.M.J., such as the
lack of a right to a lawyer as counsel in special courts-martial and to a
judge independent of the commander, but failed to make basic changes
in the command structure of the court martial.
The Vietnam War has again brought to public attention the defects
in the court-martial system. Under the challenge of wartime conditions
-with the usual increase in A.W.O.L. and discipline offenses, as well
3Statement of Arthur E. Farmer, Hearings on H. R. 2498 Before Subcom. No. 1
of the House Com. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) in VII Morgan
Papers (Harvard Law School Library).
4 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS & THE JUDGE ADVOCATES
GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES & THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION PURSUANT TO Tm U.C.M.J., 3-11 (June 1, 1952-Dec. 31, 1953).
5 See, e.g., CoMM. ON THE U.C.M.J., GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN ARMY (1960)
(report to V. M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army); REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COM-
MITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE OF THE Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
(March 1, 1961).
6HR. 3455, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
7 Act of Oct. 24, 1968, P. L. 90-632.
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as problems peculiar to the Vietnam War such as political dissent, racial
violence, and commission of war crimes-the defects in the U.C.M.J.
have become ever more apparent. As a result, there is now an active
and vocal reform movement in support of amendment of the U.C.M.J.
The military, in a not uncharacteristic stance, has taken the position
that military justice reform is inappropriate at this time since the changes
introduced by the Military Justice Act of 1968 are still being consol-
idated.8 But reformers express concern over the continuation of in-
justices in military justice which cannot be eradicated, they claim,
without fundamental changes in the U.C.M.J.
Five major bills for military justice reform are now pending in Con-
gress. Senator Birch Bayh (D. Ind.),9 Senator Mark Hatfield (R. Ore.),1"
and Congressman Charles Bennett (R. Fla.)"' have introduced sweep-
ing bills which would make fundamental changes in the structure of
the court-martial system. Congressman Charles W. WAlhalen, Jr. (D.
Ohio) and Congressman Charles M. Price (D. Ill.)' 2 have introduced
identical bills containing more limited reforms aimed only at com-
manders' control over court-martial appointments and machinery. Sen-
ator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D. N.C.) introduced a bill in 19691 to extend
new protections in administrative discharge proceedings. None of these
reform bills would completely alter the structure of the military justice
system. Each would retain the hierarchy of courts-martial to be invoked
according to the seriousness of the offense; the Bayh, Bennett, and Hat-
field bills would abolish "summary courts martial" (the lowest level of
court-martial, a one-officer disciplinary proceeding), but would retain
8 See statements of Judge Advocate General officials at panel discussion at Federal
Bar Ass'n Convention, 7 CRM. L. REP. 2528-30 (Sept. 30, 1970); Air Force Times,
Sept. 30, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
9S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Co-sponsors of the bill are Senators Harris,
Hart, and Randolph.
10 S. 4168-4178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Senator Hatfield's office has stated that
these bills will be reintroduced in the 92d Cong., 1st Sess. with minor changes and
some additions, including provisions restricting administrative discharges, permitting
judges to suspend sentence, granting credit for pretrial confinement against sentence,
and providing for law clerks for judges of the Court of Military Appeals and the
Courts of Military Review.
11 H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). This bill is essentially identical to the
Bayh bill which was first introduced as S. 4191, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Although
it follows the basic court-martial structural proposals made by the Bayh bill, it con-
tains distinctively different provisions concerning court martial jurisdiction.
12 H.R. 6901, 92 Cong, 1st Sess. (1971) (Whalen); H.R. 2196, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) (Price). These bills are essentially the same as the bill introduced in the last
Congress by Senator Tydings and cosponsored by sixteen other senators, S. 3117,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
13 S. 1266, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Senator Ervin's office has stated that this bill
will be reintroduced in the 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
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the "general courts-martial" and "special courts-martial." However, the
bills would make substantial changes in the administrative structure of
these courts-martial. Let us look at the major areas of controversy
in the military justice system and the changes which the reform bills
would make:
Crimes and Punishments. Under the original U.C.M.J., military jus-
tice was viewed as a total criminal law system with jurisdiction to try
servicemen for all crimes committed at any time or place, consistent
with the popular military adage that "a serviceman is on duty 24 hours
a day." The U.C.M.J. also claimed court-martial jurisdiction over cer-
tain civilians, such as persons accompanying armed forces in the field
during wartime or outside the United States. In 1955, however, the
Supreme Court began chipping away at court martial jurisdiction over
civilians, ruling that there was no jurisdiction over discharged service-
men, 14 civilian dependents overseas in peacetime,' 5 or civilian employees
of the military overseas. 16 Then, in June, 1969, in O'Callahan v. Parker,7
the Supreme Court found that there is no court-martial jurisdiction
over an attempted rape committed by a serviceman while off-post and
in civilian clothes. The Court held that courts-martial lack jurisdiction
over offenses committed by servicemen where these offenses are not
"service-connected."
The O'Callahan decision has left court martial jurisdiction in an un-
certain state because of the vagueness of the "service-connected" stand-
ard. The Court of Military Appeals has given the term a broad con-
struction, holding that offenses are "service-connected" when committed
on-post,' 8 and when committed off-post if they involve drugs,19 if they
14 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). S. 1744, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971), introduced by Senator Ervin, provides for the trial of persons no longer
.subject to court-martial jurisdiction for crimes committed while in the armed forces.
15 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960).
16McElroy. v. United States ex rel. Guargliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v.
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960). S. 1745, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Senator
Ervin, provides for the trial of persons serving as employees of or accompanying the
armed forces for crimes committed outside the United States.
* 17395 U.S. 258 (1969).
18 United States v. Field, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 119, 41 C.M.R. 119 (1969); United States
v. Hallahan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 46, 41 C.M.R. 46 (1969); United States v. Shockley 18
U.S.C.M.A. 610, 40 C.M.R. 322 (1969); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 40
C.M.R.321 (1969).
19 United States v. Rose, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 41 C.M.R. 3 (1969); United States v.
Castro, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969); United States v. Beeker, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969). But see United States v. Morley, 20 U.S.C.MA.
179, 43 C.M.R 19 (1970) (no court martial jurisdiction over charges of sale, as opposed
to possession or delivery, of marihuana off-post to a civilian).; Moylan v. Laird, 305
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are perpetrated against other servicemen,20 or if military rank was used in
committing the crime.2' The Supreme Court recently upheld court-
martial jurisdiction over a kidnapping and rape committed by a service-
man on-post,22 but the Court of Military Appeals' approval of court-
martial jurisdiction over various off-post offenses is still in doubt and
will require further litigation in the federal courts.
The reason given by the Supreme Court for taking a narrow view of
court-martial jurisdiction is that a court martial does not provide many
of :the constitutional rights available in civilian trials, such as the rights
to indictment by grand jury, to a jury of one's peers, and to a trial
process free from command control. These considerations have also led
to proposals that court-martial jurisdiction be limited by Congress to
those cases where, for reasons of practicality and military necessity,
trial in a civilian court is not possible. Thus, the 1959 American Legion
bill proposed removing court-martial jurisdiction over all civilian-type
crimes," and two of the bills now pending in Congress would limit
court-martial jurisdiction much further than the post-O'Callahan mili-
tary court cases have done.
The' Hatfield bill would leave court-martial jurisdiction over only
'18 typically military offenses (such as A.W.O.L., missing move-
ment, and insubordination); it would transfer to the federal courts
jurisdiction over the other 37 offenses listed in the U.C.M.J., including
bdth serious military offenses '(like mutiny and aiding the enemy) and
civilian-type offenses (like murder and larceny).4 The Bennett bill
would limit court-martial jurisdiction of "upper courts" (similar to the
present general court-martial) to ten serious military offenses (such as
desertion and mutiny) and to nine other serious civilian-type crimes
i(like murder and rape) if committed outside the territorial limits of
the United States. 25 It would limit jurisdiction of "lower courts" (simi-
F.' Supp. 551 (D.R.I. 1969) (enjoining court martial on grounds no jurisdiction over
charges of possession of marihuana off-post).
20 United States v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 210 (1970); United States
v. Everson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 70, 41 C.M.R. 70 (1969); United States v. Camacho, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 11, 41 C.M.R. 11 (1969); United States v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9, 41
C.M.R. 9 (1969). But see United States v. Wills, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 8, 42 C.M.R. 200
(1970) (no court martial jurisdiction over charges of interstate transportation of
vehicle stolen from fellow serviceman).
21 United States v. Haagenson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 332, 41 C.M.R. 332 (1970); United
States v. Peterson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 319, 41 C.M.R. 319 (1970); United States v. Fryman,
19 U.S.C.M.A. 71, 41 C.M.R. 71 (1969); United States v. Morrisseau, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
17, 41 C.M.R. 17 (1969).22 Relford v. Commandant, 397 U.S. 934 (1971).
23 H.R. 3455, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
24S. 4178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. S 821 ((1970).
25 H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 818 (1971).
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lar to the present special court-martial) to 19 less serious military offenses
(like A.W.O.L.) and 20 less serious military and civilian-type crimes
(like destruction of government property and larceny) if committed
outside the territorial limits of the United States. 26 The Bayh bill calls
for a special committee to study the desirability of transferring to the
federal courts jurisdiction over certain cases involving desertion and
A.W.O.L
A decision as to how much to limit court-martial jurisdiction is not
easily made. On the one hand, cogent arguments can be made that.
servicemen should not be relegated to an inferior form of criminal due
process in a court-martial unless trial by a civilian court is impossible
or inadequate under the circumstances. The experience of the West
German Army, which has not had a court-martial system since the end
of World War II, indicates that servicemen can be tried in civilian
courts without affecting military efficiency.2 However, the German
army is small and does not have substantial forces abroad, and special
arrangements would have to be made for trial of American servicemen
who commit crimes outside the United States. It can also be argued
in support of a broader court-martial jurisdiction that trial of servicemen
by local civilian juries can be unfair. Many of our military installations
are located in small communities and trial by local juries which distrust
tenant servicemen or are subject to parochial prejudices and attitudes
may not be desirable for servicemen who are not in the locality by
choice.
It appears that the broad scope of court-martial jurisdiction has little
to do with military necessity or administrative convenience and that
many offenses committed by servicemen could be tried in civilian courts
with the advantageous effect of according servicemen the same due
process rights which civilians enjoy. Further consideration as to what
offenses should no longer remain under exclusive military court juris-
diction is a necessary step in the reform of military justice.
The U.C.M.J. contains a number of traditional military offenses
which, under today's standards, are either unduly vague or constitute
a direct infringement upon servicemen's free speech rights. Article 88,"
forbidding officers from uttering "contemptuous words against the Presi-
26H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 819 (1971).
27 S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1259 (1971).
28 See generally E. WALDMAN, THE GOOSE STEP is VERBoTTEN: THE GERMAN ARMY
TODAY (1964); R. Moe, A SURVEY OF POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT INNOVATIONS IN THE GER-
MAN BUNDEswEH (PhD. dissertation of American University, 1966), Dissertation Ab-
stracts: No. 6-7, p. 1889-A; N.Y. Times, April 11, 1969, at 12, col. 1; Id., April 9, 1969,
at 3, cols. 1-2.
29 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1964).
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dent" and other named public officials, and Article 89,30 forbidding
"disrespect" towards a superior commissioned officer, are examples of
particularly authoritarian limitations which are of questionable useful-
ness in today's military. Article 88 is rarely used, being invoked for the
first time since 1951 in the 1965 court-martial of Lt. Henry Howe for
carrying a sign critical of the President in an off-post peace rally while in
civilian clothes.3 1 Article 89 is so vague in its terms that it, too, can be
a source of discriminatory prosecution. Both offenses are so broad in
scope, not being limited to situations involving "fighting words" or a
clear and present danger of a breach of discipline, that they constitute
a direct infringement upon servicemen's free speech rights which would
be unconstitutional in civilian life. 2 Since they are subject to abuse and
since there are other military offenses (such as disobedience) which
provide the military with considerable legal authority to maintain order
and discipline, a case can be made for abolishing these offenses. The
contrary argument is that military discipline can be undercut by ex-
pressions of contemptuous words about public officials by officers and
by acts of disrespect which do not amount to disobedience, and so
Articles 88 and 89 are necessary tools for preserving military dis-
cipline.33 The Hatfield bill would abolish Articles 88 and 89, 4 while
the Bennett bill would shift jurisdiction over Article 88 to the federal
courts unless committed outside the territorial limits of the United
States.3 5
Even more questionable in a modern criminal code are the "general
articles" of the U.C.M.J., Article 133 which forbids "conduct unbe-
coming an officer and a gentleman" -" and Article 134 which forbids
"disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline"
and "conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces." 
It would be unconstitutional to try a civilian for offenses such as these;
they are so vague that it is questionable whether they provide adequate
notice of what is criminal and so broad that a commander and court-
30 10 U.S.C. S 889 (1964).
31 United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
32 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563 (1968); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
33 See Wiener, Are the General Military Articles Unconstitutionaly Vague?, 54
A.B.A.J. 357 (1968).
34S. 4178, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970).
35 H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 819 (1971).
36 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1964).
37 10 U.S.C. S 934 (1964).
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martial members may interpret the crime according to their own feel-
ings."3s Although the Manual for Courts-Martial contains a number of
precise specifications for charging a serviceman under Article 133 (from
cheating on an examination to failure to pay a debt) 3 and Article 134
(58 specifications from abusing a public animal to wrongful cohabita-
tion) ,40 many of these specifications are themselves vague and overbroad
infringements on constitutional rights (such as making "disloyal stat6-
ments"); moreover, the Manual states that these are only examples of
the type of acts a commander can treat as criminal under the general
articles. 1
Few people would argue that a commander should not have the dis-
ciplinary power to enforce unwritten military standards of conduct,
and it would certainly be difficult to draft criminal offenses with -par-
ticularity for every type of conduct which adversely affects discipline
and good order in the military. However, a court-martial under the
general articles involves not merely discipline, but a criminal prosecu-
tion. It is one thing for a commander to be able to discipline his men
for failure to comply with vague and unwritten standards of conduct-
using such minor punishments as restriction to quarters, denial of passes
and other privileges, additional duties, even demotion, forfeiture of pay,
and short-term confinement. It is quite another thing to permit, as
the general articles do, the trial of servicemen for violation of vague
standards in a general court martial with maximum sentences of up to
20 years confinement.
General Samuel T. Ansell, the acting Judge Advocate General of the
Army in World War I and an ardent advocate of military justice re-
form, was greatly disturbed by the vagueness and overbreadth of the
general articles. He felt these articles were necessary because of the
difficulty of drafting rules for every-day conduct with greater speci-
ficity, but he accepted the proposal that they carry a maximum sentence
of six months.4 2 The Hatfield bill adopts that position, limiting charges
under Articles 133 and 134 to Article 15 non-judicial punishment pro-
ceedings in which the maximum punishment is correctional custody
38 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1965); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). The Court of Military
Appeals, however, has upheld their constitutionality in the military context, United
States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967); United States v. Frantz, 2
U.S.C.M.A. 161, 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953).
3 9 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNIT STATES 1969 (Revised Edition), app. 6c, art
133, at A6-20 [hereinafter cited as MCM 1969].
40 Id. app. 6c, art 134, at A6-20-26.
41 MCM 1969, paras. 212, 213, at 28-71-72.
4 2 See S. 64, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. art. 96 (1919).
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for seven days (30 days if imposed by a field grade officer), plus restric-
tions, extra duties, partial forfeiture or detention of pay, and demotion. 43
The Bennett bill would shift jurisdiction over Articles 133 and 134 to
federal courts except when committed outside the territorial limits of
the United States."
The Bayh, Bennett, and Hatfield bills also attempt to remedy an
injustice whereby servicemen can be tried and punished for the same
offense in both a court-martial and a state court (although not a federal
court). The Bayh and Bennett 45 bills forbid retrial for the same offense,
and the Hatfield bill46 provides that where there is disagreement between
civil and military authorities as to jurisdiction to try a serviceman, he
may elect the court in which he wants to be tried.
Court-martial sentences-Under the U.C.M.J., court-martial members
not only determine guilt or innocence, but also the sentence. This
differs from federal courts and most state courts where the judge, not
the jury, sentences a convicted defendant.4 One trouble with letting
the court members sentence is that they frequently do not have the
experience to insure that the sentence is consistent with sentences given
in other cases. Also, court members may lack the objectivity expected
of a judge, giving unduly harsh sentences where a case has offended
them. For example, the first three men court-martialled for participat-
ing in a brief sit-down strike at the Presidio stockade in 1968 received
sentences of 14, 15, and 16 years which were later drastically reduced
by the Judge Advocate General after intense public criticism. 9
The Bayh and Bennett bills would give sentencing power to military
judges.50 The Hatfield bill 1 would prevent suspension, as has been
done in Vietnam for some offenses,52 of the Table of Maximum Punish-
43 S. 4178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
44 H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. S 819 (1971).
45 S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. S 844 (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., ist Sess. § 844
(1971).
46 S. 4171, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. S 803 (1970).
47 10 U.S.C. 5§ 851-852 (1964).
48 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32; See also MODEL PENAL CODE S 6.
49 United States v. Sood,-C.M.R.-(A.C.M.R. 16 June 1970). See generally F. GARD-
NER, THE UNLAWFUL CONCERT: AN ACcouNT OF THE PRESIDIO MUTN Y CASE (1970).
50S. 1127, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 826 (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. S 826
(1971).
51S. 4178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 856 (1970).
52 E.g., on December 3, 1966, the President increased the authorized maximum punish-
ment for misbehavior of sentinels in combat zones, namely Vietnam. Exec. Order No.
11317, 3 C.F.R. 170 (1966). The table was suspended for certain offenses in the Korean
War, Exec. Order No. 10247, 3 C.F.R. 754 (1953), and in World War 11, MCM 1951,
para. 127c, at 271 n. 1. See also Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1968).
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ments, which is the only limitation on maximum sentences which a
general court-martial can give. The Bayh and Bennett bills also call
for a study by a special committee to identify and recommend correc-
tive action for inequities in the maximum punishments prescribed by
the Table, to recommend sub-categories of offenses based upon differ-
ences in the degree of seriousness of the offenses, and to consider the
advisability of legislation limiting the authority of the President to sus-
pend the Table for particular offenses. 53
Rights of Servicemen Incident to Search and Arrest-The U.C.M.J. ex-
tended to servicemen broad rights against self-incrimination, 54 and the
Court of Military Appeals has generally followed the decisions of the
Warren court concerning arrest and search and seizure.5 5 Military court
requirements for probable cause prior to the issuance of arrest and search
warrants are comparable to civilian court requirements. 6 However,
military warrants are issued by commanders (often the same commander
who has ordered or approved the arrest or search) rather than by inde-
pendent magistrates as in civilian courts. A request for issuance of a
warrant need not be supported by sworn affidavits as in civilian courts;
thus, there is no written record for determining later the sufficiency of
the showing of probable cause. The Bayh and Bennett bills take the
power to issue search warrants from commanders and put it in military
judges; they also provide that no search and seizure shall be ordered by
a military judge "except in writing upon probable cause supported by
written affidavits and particularly describing the person or place to be
searched or the person or thing to be seized." 67 There appears to be
little to be said in favor of continuing to permit commanders who are
neither lawyers nor impartial magistrates to issue search warrants. The
increased work load on military judges should not be substantial and
would seem to be outweighed by the added protection provided accused
servicemen.
None of the bills have addressed themselves to another aspect of
53S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1259 (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1259
(1971).
54 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964).
55 See generally Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages Over
a Civilian Defendant, 22 MAINE L. REv. 105 (1970); Quinn, Some Comparisons between
Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1240, 1353-58 (1968); Sherman,
The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REv. 3, 64-78 (1970).
56 MCM 1969, para. 154, at 27-62-5; Exec. Order No. 10214, 3 C.F.R. 90 (Supp. 1951);
Quinn, note 55 supra.
57S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 846 (1971); H.R. 579., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 846
(1971).
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military search and seizure which compares unfavorably with civilian
practice-the fact that commanders have the power to conduct admin-
istrative searches (such as routine inspections and "shakedowns" which
require all men to display their belongings) which are not considered
searches subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment and there-
fore do not require warrants or probable cause.58 It has been suggested
that items discovered in such administrative searches be subject to con-
fiscation or to use as the basis for disciplinary action, but not be admis-
sible as evidence in a court martial. It has also been suggested that
servicemen be permitted to have one area-such as a personal locker-
which is not subject to unannounced administrative inspections unless a
search warrant has been issued or the usual civilian requirements for
a warrantless search are met. Such provisions would extend a modicum
of privacy to the serviceman but are strenuously opposed by the mili-
tary as permitting a haven for contraband and unauthorized possession
of property.
Pre-Trial Investigation and Indictment-Servicemen are specifically ex-
cluded by the Fifth Amendment from the right to indictment by a
Grand Jury, and there is no provision under military law for a prelim-
inary hearing to determine probable cause for prosecution." However,
Article 32 of the U.C.M.J. provides for a mandatory pre-trial investi-
gation before charges can be referred to a general court-martial (but not
a special court-martial). The accused is entitled to present evidence
and cross-examine witnesses, as is permitted in civilian preliminary
hearings but not in the usual Grand Jury proceeding. The commander,
as convening authority, chooses one of his officers, often a non-lawyer,
to serve as investigating officer. The investigating officer's findings and
recommendations are not binding, however, and the commander may
refer the charges to a court-martial over a contrary recommendation. °
This contrasts with civilian procedure under which a person cannot
be tried if the magistrate at the preliminary hearing finds no probable
cause or if the Grand Jury refuses to indict.
The Bayh and Bennett bills do away with the Article 32 pre-trial
investigation and essentially adopt the federal pretrial procedure minus
the Grand Jury.6 ' A serviceman would be entitled to an initial appear-
58 See Sherman, note 55 supra, at 67-68.
59 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c); see generally Anderson, The Preliminary Hearing-Better
Alternatives or More of the Same?, 35 Mo. L. REv. 281 (1970).
60 MCM 1969, para. 34, at 7-9.
61S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 832 (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. $ 832
(1971).
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ance before a military judge within 24 hours after arrest or preferral
of charges. He would be informed at that time of the charges against
him and of his right to a civilian lawyer of his choice or an appointed
military lawyer. Within a reasonable time, the military judge would
hold a preliminary hearing unless it were waived by the accused. The
accused could cross-examine witnesses, discover the evidence against
him, and introduce evidence in his own behalf. If the judge determined
from the evidence that there was probable cause that an offense had
been committed by the accused, he would forward the charges together
with a summary record of the preliminary examination to the Prosecu-
tion Division of the Regional Command (to be discussed in a later sec-
tion). The Prosecution Division would refer the charges to a court-
martial if it determined that there were sufficient evidence to convict.
Thus the commander would be removed entirely from the pre-trial
hearing process, and the accused would be provided a full preliminary,
hearing before a judge whose determination as to probable cause could
not be overruled by the commander.
In contrast, the Hatfield bill retains the Article 32 pre-trial investi-
gation structure with some changes." The Judicial Circuit Officer (to,
be discussed in a later section) rather than the commander would ap-:
point the investigating officer who must be from another command.
If the investigating officer recommended that the charges not be re-
ferred to a court-martial, the Judicial Circuit Officer could over-rule
him only by making a written report on each issue of fact and law,
giving reasons for his determination that there is legally sufficient evi-
dence to support the charges. If either the investigating officer or the
Judiciaf Circuit Officer recommended against court-martial, the com-
mander could appeal to the Judge Advocate General for a final deter-
mination as to whether to court-martial. Thus the commander's desire
to court-martial one of his men could not be entirely frustrated by a
contrary recommendation by the investigating officer or the Judicial'
Circuit Officer, but the commander would have to win his case before-
the Judge Advocate General to overrule them. This is more of a com-
promise toward command control than the Bayh and Bennett bills,
but it does place some restraint on the absolute authority of com-
manders to have someone court-martialled.
Pre-Trial Release-The constitutional right to pre-trial bail does not
apply in the military. However, a serviceman is entitled to pre-trial
release from confinement as provided by the Manual for Courts-Martial,
62 S. 4168, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 832, 834, 838 (1970).
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unless it is deemed necessary "to insure the presence of the accused at
the trial or because of the seriousness of the offense charged." ' The
military courts have interpreted this provision as giving the com-
mander broad discretion in granting pre-trial release and will over-rule
his determination not to permit release only for gross abuse of .discre-
tion. As a result, servicemen are frequently incarcerated prior to trial
when charged with possession of marijuana, A.W.O.L., and political
or dissent activities.64 The breadth of this discretion has resulted in
charges of unfairness in the administration of pre-trial release. For ex-
ample, a private charged in a special court martial with making "disloyal
statements" filed an unsuccessful petition for release claiming discrim-
ination because Lt. William Calley, charged with 102 murders in-a
general court martial, was granted pre-trial release. 65
A broader right to pre-trial release, or at least a right to have some-
one other than the commander make the decision as to release, would
not seem to present a threat to military discipline. It would avoid need-
less incarceration, with its attendant aggravation of personality and
psychiatric disorders, and permit productive assignment of the accused
by the military prior to trial and greater assistance by the accused in his
own defense. The Bayh and Bennett bills would give military judges
the power to grant pre-trial release both at the time of the initial appear-
ance and after the preliminary examination;"6 bail would be granted
in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the armed
force. The Bayh, Bennett, and Hatfield bills limit the military judge's
discretion to deny bail to cases where confinement is necessary to
insure presence at trial.6 The Bayh and Bennett bills would also, give
servicemen credit against their sentences for time spent in pre-trial
confinement."
63 MCM 1969, para. 19c, at 5-3.
64 Dexter v. Chafee, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 289, 41 C.M.R. 289 (1970). See also post-conviction
release cases, United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 518, 42 C.M.R. 120 (1970); Dale
v. United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 254, 41 C.M.R. 254 (1970); Reed v. Ohman, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 110, 41 C.M.R. 110 (1969); Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R.
399 (1967)
65 Homer v. Resor, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 285, 41 C.M.R. 285 (1970).
66S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 832 (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 832
(1971).
67S. 1127, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. S 832 (1971); H.R. 579, 92nd Cong.. 1st Sess. § 832
(1971); S. 4172, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. S 810 (1970). The Bayh and Bennett bills also
permit an appeal from a denial of bail to the Court of Military Review. H.R. 7442, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Cong. Teague, would amend Art. 57, U.C.M.J.,
to give servicemen benefits of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.
68S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 857(b) (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. S
857(b) (1971). S. 1743, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Senator Ervin, would
also permit pretrial confinement to be deducted from a serviceman's sentence.
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Preparation for Trial-The military has liberal rules for obtaining evi-
dence and witnesses.69 However, as in so many aspects of the court-
martial system, the command plays a key role in the discovery process.
If the defense counsel wants to obtain discovery of particular items or
to subpoena certain witnesses for trial, he must go to the trial counsel
(prosecutor). In the case of a witness, he must submit a written state-
ment of expected testimony and reasons why the personal appearance
of the witness is necessary, thus having to reveal his evidence and strategy
in advance.70 If the trial counsel refuses to make the discovery or to
subpoena the witness, the matter is referred to the commander con-
vening authority for decision. This differs from civilian court pro-
cedure in which the judge rules on requests for discovery and subpoena
of witnesses."
The Bayh, Bennett,72 and Hatfield 73 bills provide that requests for
discovery and subpoena of witnesses shall be submitted to the military
judge. The Bayh and Bennett bills establish the same standards as in
federal criminal courts for such determinations and provide that a re-
fusal by a military judge is subject to interlocutory appeal to the Court
of Military Review.
Commanders' Role in the Court Martial-The most significant difference
between a civilian criminal trial and a court martial is that the com-
mander convening authority carries out many functions which are
exercised by independent officials in a civilian trial. In a civilian court,
the district attorney decides whether to prosecute; the judge determines
whether there is sufficient evidence to go to a Grand Jury; the Grand
Jury decides whether to indict; the defense counsel is an independent
lawyer hired by or appointed for the defendant; the jury is made up of
twelve citizens chosen at random from the community; and the appeals
courts are separate and independent tribunals.
In contrast, under the court-martial system, the commander who
decides to court-martial one of his men plays some part in each of these
functions. He decides whether to bring court martial charges; he ap-
points the investigating officer whose recommendation he can overrule;
he can handpick the jury, prosecutor and defense counsel from his
officers; and, when the trial is over, he can reverse the conviction or
69 See Sherman, note 55 supra, at 7 3-6.
70 MCM 1969, para. 115, at 23-1-4.
71 Fed. R. Crim. P. 15, 16, 17.
72S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., S 846(a) (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess,
S 846(a) (1971).
73S. 4175, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 846 (1970).
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reduce the penalty. He may also carry out certain administrative func-
tions in the court martial: plea bargaining with the accused,74 granting
immunity to witnesses in return for testimony favorable to the prosecu-
tion,75 and overseeing, personally or through subordinates such as his
Staff Judge Advocate, the conduct of the trial.70 He even has the power
to order a charge reinstated where it has been dismissed by a military
judge on such grounds as failure to provide a speedy trial or legal insuf-
ficiency of the charge.77
"Command control" is the most criticized aspect of military justice.
Charges of command influence have been raised in most of the contro-
versial court martial cases of the last five years-the trial of Captain
Levy, the filing of charges against members of the Pueblo crew, the
Presidio "mutiny" cases, the "Green Beret" murder case, the courts-
martial of numerous anti-war dissenters, and the My Lai prosecutions.
In most of these cases there was intense command interest in prosecu-
tion and considerable involvement of the command in the proceedings.
Following the Presidio mutiny trials, which were referred to trial by
the commanding general over the contrary recommendation of an in-
vestigating officer, one of the defense counsel, Captain Brendan V.
Sullivan, observed: "I know now that you should always get a civilian
lawyer. We were under such tremendous pressure not to challenge
the structure of the court, not to challenge the pretrial advice, not to
challenge the system." 18
The U.C.M.J. forbids improper command influence of a court mar-
tial. Article 37 prohibits the convening authority from censuring, rep-
74 Pre-trial agreements are not provided for in the U.C.M.J., but have been used
since their initiation by the Acting Judge Advocate General of the Army in 1953
and have been upheld by the military courts. United States v. Villa, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
564, 42 C.M.R. 166 (1970); United States v. Callahan, 22 C.M.R. 443, 447 (A.B.R.
1956). Some limitations have been placed on their use, United States v. Veteto, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 64, 39 C.M.R. 64 (1968); United States v. Brady, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 614, 38
C.M.R. 412 (1968); United States v. Cummings, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 376, 38 C.M.R. 174
(1968). There are guilty pleas in two-thirds of all Army general courts-martial and
three-fourths of these are negotiated pleas. 1 THE AuvocAT, April 1969, at 1.
75 MCM 1969, para. 150b, at 27-58-9; United States v. Kirsch, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 84,
35 C.M.R. 56 (1964); United States v. Guttenplan, 20 C.M.R. 764 (A.F.B.R. 1955).
76 The convening authority has general supervisory control over all the administrative
aspects of the trial and personnel involved in the trial. He can excuse court mem-
bers both before, and, in certain situations, after the trial has begun. United States
v. Allen, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 626, 18 C.M.R. 250 (1955); United States v. Geraghty, 40 C.M.R.
499 (A.C.M.R. 1969).
7710 U.S.C. § 862(a) (1964); Priest v. Koch, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 41 C.M.R. 293
(1970); Lowe v. Laird, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 131, 39 C.M.R. 131 (1969); United States v.
Boehm, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 530, 38 C.M.R.. 328 (1968).
78 F. GARDNER, THE UNLAWFUL CONCERT, note 49 supra, at 143.
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rimanding, or admonishing any court member, law officer, or counsel:
concerning the findings or sentence and from attempting to coerce or,
by any unlawful means, influence the action of a court-martial or any:
member.7 9 Violation of this article is a crime, but it was obvious from:
the start that Article 37 was unlikely to prevent command influence.
First, there is no clear line between proper and improper command
influence; secondly, the commander's power to appoint the court and
supervise the court martial permits him ample opportunity to influence
the outcome of trials by quite legal means. Thus, when the U.C.M.J.
was introduced, Arthur Farmer testified:
The provisions of Article 37 which prohibit the censure of the
court and counsel and any attempt to coerce the court's actions,
will be valueless in a situation where the commanding general de-
sires to circumvent them. It is naive to suppose that it will be
necessary for the commanding general to use such direct means of
influencing the court that they could form the basis for prosecu-
tion under Article 37. 80
This prediction has proved accurate. Although, as the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals has observed, "in the nature of things, command control
is scarcely ever apparent on the face of the record," 81 there have been
an increasing number of documented cases of improper command in-
fluence on courts-martial.82 There has never been a prosecution of a
commander under Article 37 for exercising improper command in-
,9 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964).
80 Statement of Arthur E. Farmer, note 3 supra, at 2.
.81 United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 149, 37 C.M.R. 411, 413 (1967).
82 See F. GARDNER, THE UNLAWFUL CONCERT, note 49 supra; G.I. RIGHTS AND ARMY
JUSTICE: THE DRAFTEE'S GUIDE TO MILITARY LIFE AND LAw 241-266 (1970); R. SHERRILL,
MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC 40-178 (1970); A. STAIP,
Up AGAINST THE BRASS 37-54, 107-156 (1970); West, A History of Connmand In-
fluence on the Military judicial System, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1970); West, Conmnand
Influence, in CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND 73 (J. Finn ed. 1971); Rothblatt, Military jus-
tice or Injustice: The Green Beret Case, 75 CASE AND COMMENT 3 (1970); Fuchs-
berg, Connnand Influence on Military justice, 7 TRIAL 36 (1971)). Charges of com-
mand influence have been raised in such publicized cases as the Green Beret murder
case, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1969, at 3, col. 4; Id., Sept. 27, 1969, at 3, col. 3, and the
My Lai prosecution, Torres v. Commanding Officer (M.D.Ga. 1970) (three judge
court) and in a number of other cases, Cobb. v. Matthews, Civil No. 70-1042H (D.Md.
1970); United States v. Harrison, 41 C.M.R. 179 (A.C.M.R. 1970); McGuire v. United
States, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 651, (1968); Cooks v. United States, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 651 (1968);
Wells v. United States (Pet. for Writ of H.C., U.S.C.M.A., 23 Nov. & 7 Dec. .1964);
United States v. Kitchens, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 31 C.M.R. 175 (1961); United States. V.
Pierce, 29 C.M.R. 849 (A.B.R. 1960); United States v. Olivas, 26 C.M.R. 686 (A.B.R.
1958).
CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
fluence. One of the rare instances in which command influence has been
publicized occurred at Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri, in 1967 when
ninety-three court-martial convictions were reversed by the Court of
Military Appeals because of charges of improper command influence. s3
There was evidence that the commanding general, Major General
Thomas Lipscomb, had publicized his view that court-martial sentences
were too lenient, had expressed his displeasure about certain verdicts
and sentences to court members and counsel, and that he personally
had directed certain administrative functions to insure that the verdicts
would be consonant with his disciplinary -policies. A military investi-
gation found that he had acted unwisely but not illegally, and no action
was taken against him."4
The military contends that the number of cases of improper command
influence is small, as indicated by the small number of cases in -which
the issue has been raised. They argue further that despite the risk of
improper command influence, commanders must be left in control of
court martial machinery or discipline will suffer. A commander is
charged with insuring discipline and order within his unit, and he can
be held personally responsible by his superiors for any shortcomings
of his unit. Great importance is placed upon this personal liability of
commanders in the military. The commander is given broad powers
for disciplining and "shaping up" his men, and his failure to use .these
powers would be considered dereliction of duty. Removal of the com-
mander's individual control over certain phases of the court-martial
is viewed as undercutting his position and lessening his ability to enforce
discipline. Members of the military are used to playing different, some-
times inconsistent, roles ("wearing a number of hats," as the military
expression goes), and the military claims there is no conflict of interest
where a commander controls both the enforcement of discipline (in-
cluding the decision to court-martial his men) and the administration
of the criminal trial.
The problem with this position is that a commander, no matter how
fair and conscientious, can become personally involved in disciplinary
matters, and this involvement may affect his view of how the -case
should be handled. A commander is in a position to exert considerable
-influence on the outcome of a trial by merely using his legal powers.
Charged with the responsibility for maintaining good order and disci-
pline among his troops, it may be difficult ,for a commander to,.achieve
83 United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967).
8 4 See N.Y. Times, June 25, .1968, 'at 3, col. 3; Id., Oct. 25, 1967, at 1, col. 1; Id.,
July 22, 1967, at 1, co l. 5. .. ... .
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the degree of detachment required of administrators in a civilian crim-
inal law system.
There is also something unrealistic about the notion that a com-
mander must possess all effective powers over the appointment and
supervision of a court-martial to secure his authority over his men.
Today, with instant communications and easy mobility, there is no
reason to believe that a particular commander's effectiveness would be
destroyed if he relied upon other agencies or commands to perform
court-martial functions. The nature of discipline has changed dra-
matically since World War II as technology has transformed the mili-
tary into a highly trained and bureaucratic society."5 The traditional
military view of the commander as an all powerful pater familias is
something of an anachronism and, even among combat troops, the
specialization of jobs has removed much of the need for absolute powers
vested in individual commanders. Our civilian paramilitary, such as
police and firemen, demonstrate that men can perform essential and
life-endangering activities effectively within a relationship where the
superior lacks absolute disciplinary powers over his subordinates. There
is, of course, no way to know how millions of servicemen would react
to removal of command control of courts-martial, but the steady devel-
opment away from absolute power in individual commanders in recent
years seems to indicate that there would be little effect upon military
discipline. Individual commanders would still possess substantial dis-
ciplinary powers under their informal command prerogatives and Ar-
ticle 15 non-judicial punishment powers, and the morale of servicemen
would probably be raised by removing the suspicion that the court-
martial is simply an extension of the commander's disciplinary powers.
The Bayh, Bennett,"6 Hatfield, 87 and Whalen-Price88 bills would each
establish an independent court-martial command to exercise most of the
appointive and administrative functions presently performed by the
commander or his subordinates. The bills would divide the areas in
which American troops are stationed into "Regional Commands" (the
term used in the Bayh and Bennett bills) or "Judicial Circuits" (the
term used in the Hatfield and Whalen-Price bills), each headed by a
Regional Commander or Judicial Circuit Officer under the command of
85 SeeM. JANOWITz, THE NEW MILITARY (1967); M. JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL
SOLDIER (1960); C. MOSKOs, THE AMERICAN ENusF=n MAN: THE RANK AND FILE IN
TODAY'S MILITARY (1970); A. YARMOLINSKY, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: ITS IMPACT
UPON AMERICAN SOCIETY, 324-408 (1971).
86S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. S 806(a) (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong, 1st Sess. S 806(a)
(1971).
87S. 4168, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 806(a)-(b) (1970).
88H.R. 6901, H.R. 2196, 92d Cong, 1st Sess. §5 825-B (1971).
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the Judge Advocate General. All of the bills would create separate
divisions within each circuit for military judges and defense counsel.
In addition, the Bayh, Bennett, and Hatfield bills include a division for
trial counsel (prosecutors); the Bayh, Bennett, and Whalen-Price bills
have a division for administrative functions (such as court reporters);
and the Hatfield bill has a division for trial review. Under this arrange-
ment, a commander desiring to court-martial one of his men would be
required to forward the charges to the Judicial Circuit Officer who
would administer the selection of the court members and direct the
various divisions (military judge, defense counsel, trial counsel, and
administrative) to perform in the court martial. (The Whalen-Price
bill would not remove the commander's power to appoint the court
members in a special court-martial).
The Military Justice Act of 1968 removed military judges from the
command of individual convening authorities, 9 and the services have
adapted to the circuit concept in the assignment of military judges.
These bills would extend that concept to all the functions of the court
martial, removing from the commander all tasks except the initiating
and forwarding of charges.
The establishment of an independent chain of command for the
administration of courts martial would remove the risk that a com-
mander could influence the outcome of courts-martial through his
appointive and administrative functions; but, it would not eliminate
the threat of institutional influence. Although the court martial per-
sonnel (counsel, judges, and administrators) would not be subject to
the command of the convening authority, they would remain vulnerable
to various command pressures arising out of their own Judge Advocate
General chain-of-command and out of the military itself. The new
military judge system has been criticized on the grounds that some
military judges, desirous of maintaining the upward thrust of their
military careers or deeply imbued with the command philosophy, have
been extremely sensitive to the wishes of the commanding generals at
the installations where they sit.
It appears that the only way to protect completely against command
or institutional influence is to abolish the court-martial system, as the
West German military has done or, as Great Britain has done,90 civilian-
89 10 U.S.C. S 826(c) (Supp. V 1970).
90 On Oct. 1, 1948, legal functions involving pretrial advice and prosecution of service-
men in courts-martial were transferred from the Judge Advocate General of the
Forces to new civilian Directorates of Legal Services in the War Office and Air
Ministry. F. WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JusncE 231 (1967). The Courts-Martial
(Appeals) Act., 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 46 (1951) created a civilian Courts-Martial Appeal
1971]
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:25'
ize the military legal corps so that legal officers will no longer be sub-
ject to the pressure of promotion and career. This position has been
taken by a number of contemporary critics of the military justice sys-
tem.91 However, command and institutional influence could be lessened,
even while retaining the military-dominated court-martial system. This
could be accomplished by giving military judges tenure during which
they could not be reassigned, by introducing civilian lawyers into mili-
tary judge and counsel positions, and by encouraging an independent
military legal corps through the incentives of higher pay and demilitar-
ized rules (such as abolishing the wearing of uniforms) for military
lawyers. The compromise offered in the current bills does not com-
pletely satisfy either the military or the critics of military justice,, but.
it does attack the most serious abuses of command influence and appears
to offer the most politically feasible reform for military, justice in the
foreseeable future.
Selection of Court Martial Members-The right to trial by a jury of
peers chosen at random does not apply in courts-martial. Servicemen
are tried by courts chosen by the commander-convening authority or
his subordinates from among the, officers in the command. An enlisted
man can request that one-third of the court be enlisted men, but this
right has been exercised rarely because commanders invariably appoint'
high-ranking noncommissioned officers who are considered more dis-
ciplinarian than officers.9'
The philosophy behind the civilian right to trial by a jury of peers
chosen at random is that there is a better chance for a fair trial if the
jury represents different classes, occupations, and perspectives within so-
ciety. The all-officer jury, on the other hand, is composed of a small,
select class who, by the nature of their positions, generally reflect the
attitudes of the command. This is not to say that officers do not serve
honestly and conscientiously on courts-martial; but it is to be expected
that an all-officer jury, like a jury of bank presidents or union officers,
will not reflect the wide spectrum of attitudes and biases which is basic
to the American idea of trial by. jury.
Court with direct review over courts-martial, and the Criminal Appeals Act 1966,
c. 31 further enlarged the scope of appellate review of courts-martial.
9 1 West, A History of Command Influence, note 82 supra, at 154; THE NEw YORKER,
Oct. 25, 1969, at 63, 119 (quoting Charles Morgan, Southern DirEctor of the A.C.L.U.
and counsel for Captain Howard Levy); National Conference on G.I. Rights, Reso-
lution 6, Washington, D.C., Nov. 13-14, 1969.
02 See Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 28 MIL
L. REv. 1, 25 (1965). Enlisted personnel were requested in only 2.6% of Army courts
martial in 1968 according to unpublished statistics prbvided b, the office of the' Judge
Advocate' General of the AriV.
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The all-officer court martial may have been justified in the day when
military units were often isolated and, in general, only officers were
educated. But today, when most enlisted men have at least a high
school education and logistical contact between units is not a problem,
there is little reason to limit court-martial duty to the officers in the
command. The military has expressed the very real concern that en-
listed men sitting on courts-martial would be motivated by class antago-
nisms or undue sympathy for fellow enlisted men on trial. But as
enlistees become increasingly well-educated and are given greater re-
sponsibilities within an increasingly technical military, questioning their
capacity to perform jury duty conscientiously seems somewhat incon-
sistent. It is true that enlisted men may view the proceedings from a
different perspective than officers, but that, after all, is what trial by
a jury of peers is intended to provide.
The criticism is often heard among enlisted men that the court martial
is a "kangaroo court." This lack of confidence in the fundamental fair-
ness of the all-officer court martial is reflected in the high percentage
of servicemen who choose under the Military Justice Act of 1968 to
waive their right to a jury trial in favor of trial by a military judge. 3
Allowing enlistees to serve on courts-martial would go a long way
toward restoring their confidence in the m..litary justice system.
The Bayh and Bennett bills provide .that the administrative divisior
of the Regional Command will select the members of general and special
courts-martial at random from a pool of all the officers and enlisted
men who have served on active duty for at least one year and are per-
manently stationed within that Regional Command.9" The Hatfield
bill provides for random selection of court- martial members by the
convening authority from a master roster of officers and enlisted men
at the installation; for trial of an enlisted man, one-half of the court
would be officers and one-half enlisted men,- none of whom could be
junior in rank to the defendant. 5 The Whalen-Price bill provides that
the circuit judicial officer will select members of general courts-martial
at random from the officers and enlisted men who are eligible and
available within the circuit; however, it retains the all-officer court
93 See statistics in -Douglas, The Judicialization of Military Courts, 22 HASTINGS L.J.
213 (1971); Trial by judge Alone-Danger?, 3 THE ADVOCATE 61 (March 1971)
(citing army statistics that in the last three months of 1970, from 95 to 100% of
servicemen in special courts-martial waived their right to jury trial for trial by judge
alone, as did 86 to 88% of -servicemen in general courts-martial).
94S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. . 825 (1971); H.R.' 579, 92d Cong., Ist S.ess. § 825
(1971).
S. 4169, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 825 .(1970).
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unless the defendant requests one-third enlisted men. 6 The commander
would continue to select as court members for special courts-martial
those in his command whom he deemed best qualified.
The Bayh and Bennett bills essentially adopt the jury selection pro-
cedure used in federal courts. The Hatfield and Whalen-Price bills retain
more of the traditional court-martial selection process. A series of
identical bills recently introduced in the House97 would further expand
servicemen's right to a jury trial by requiring court martial convictions
to be a unanimous verdict rather than by a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bers as is the present law (except for a verdict including the death sen-
tence which must be unanimous). This would give the enlisted mem-
bers on the court, for the first time, the determining votes as to con-
viction or not. The military has expressed concern over the administra-
tive complexity of random selection proposals, but it appears that the
procedures followed in federal courts could be transferred to the mili-
tary with minor adjustments. Special provisions might be required for
courts-martial in isolated military units, for example, with logistical sup-
port from other commands necessary in some situations.
Court-Martial Appeals-There are now three levels of appeal from a
court-martial conviction: administrative review by the commander-
convening authority and legal officers; and judicial review by the Courts
of Military Review and the Court of Military Appeals. All general
and special court-martial convictions are reviewed by the commander
who convened the court. He has the power only to remit or reduce
the sentence, but this power has tended to encourage courts to give
higher sentences, leaving it to the commander to retain or reduce them
consistent with his disciplinary policies.
The second level of appeal is to the Courts of Military Review, each
composed of three lawyers, generally career officers, assigned to the
Judge Advocate General's office. These judges have no tenure and
can be reassigned at any time. Review in these courts is available only
in cases involving generals and flag officers or sentences of death, dis-
missal, dishonorable or bad conduct discharge, or confinement of more
than one year. As a result, about two-thirds of the courts-martial, pri-
marily special courts-martial, fail to qualify for appeal to the Courts of
Military Review. The final level of appeal is to the civilian Court of
Military Appeals made up of three judges appointed by the President
to 15 year terms. There is no right to appeal to the Court of Military
96H.R. 6901, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 825 (1971); H.R. 2196, 92d Cong. ist Sess., § 825
(1971).
97 H.R. 7263, 7292, 7467, 92d Cong, 1st Sess. (1971).
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Appeals except in cases involving generals and flag officers or the death
penalty, and the Court only grants review for a relatively small num-
ber of cases appealed from the Courts of Military Review.
The Hatfield bill expands servicemen's rights to appeal court-martial
convictions. It permits an appeal to the Court of Military Review where
sentence exceeds four months confinement (thus extending the possi-
bility of appeal to special court-martial cases not involving bad conduct
discharges) and to the Court of Military Appeals where a sentence
exceeds one year.98
The Bayh, Bennett, and Hatfield bills also increase the opportunity
for servicemen to obtain review of court-martial convictions in federal
courts. The Bayh and Bennett bills for the first time permit servicemen
to appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Court
of Military Appeals."9 The Hatfield bill permits servicemen to sue in
federal courts where constitutional rights have been denied by court-
martial or other military action or where judicial action is necessary
to prevent a chilling effect upon these rights." All three bills permit
military lawyers to bring suits for extraordinary relief in federal courts
on behalf of their servicemen clients, a right they may not presently
exercise.' 0 '
The reform bills also propose changes in the structure of the military
appeals courts with an eye toward greater efficiency. Under the Hatfield
bill, judges of the Court of Military Review would enjoy increased
security and independence. They would be appointed by the President
for three-year terms and their judicial performance would not be rated
by military superiors.0 2 The Bayh and Bennett bills would enlarge the
Court of Military Appeals from three to nine judges, authorizing it to
sit in three-judge panels. °O
Administrative Discharges-Although not part of the court-martial sys-
tem, procedures for administrative discharges are closely related to
military justice. They permit a serviceman to be administratively dis-
charged with a less-than-honorable discharge which may have serious
98S. 4168, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 865 (1970); S. 4173, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 867
(1970).
9S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1259 (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1259
(1971).
100 S. 4170, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 867 (a) (1970).
101S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 838, 870 (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 838, 870 (1971); S. 4170, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 876(a) (1970).
102 S. 4174, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 866 (1970).
103S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 867 (1971); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 867
(1971).
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adverse consequences in his later years. A serviceman is entitled to a
hearing before a board of military officers before he can be adminis-
tratively discharged, but his rights in that hearing are more limited
than in a court-martial. He is entitled to legally trained counsel'if
such counsel is reasonably available, but he is not entitled to com-
pulsory attendance of witnesses. Senator Ervin described administra-
tive discharge procedures at a Judge Advocate General's Conference on
July 16, 1969:
Imagine if you will a system of justice with the burden of proving
innocence imposed on the defendant, secret informants, no right
to trial, no right to see the evidence, no right of cross-examina-
tion, no rule against double jeopardy, no protection against punish7.
ment even when found innocent, no right to legally qualified coun-
sel, no independent judge, no independent judicial review, and no
clearly defined rules of what is and is not against the law.
This, in harsh terms, and with very little exaggeration, is the. sys-
tem which can brand a man as "undesirable," "unfit," or "unsuit-
able," deprive him of his serviceman's rights, .his accruing pen-
sion and retirement, his employability, and his honor.104
The Ervin bill1"5 and anticipated changes in the Hatfield bill'06 would
remedy these deficiencies, extending a number of basic due' process
rights to servicemen in administrative discharge proceedings. These
reforms have been pending for about ten years, and the military does
not claim to be in substantial disagreement with Senator Ervin's critical
assessment of the administrative discharge situation.
Conclusion
The observation of Professor William L. McBride in his article,
Towards a Phenomenology of International Justice, is especially re-
vealing in the context of military law. "We are at present," he writes,
"passing through a period (and this is not a uniquely American phe-
nomenon) in which practices that were once regarded as having been
ordained and confirmed by our legal systems are being severely chal-
lenged on the grounds that they do not accord with the fundamental
logic of the systems themselves." 107 A number of military justice
104 115 CONG. REC. 136 (1969), Remarks of Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., at Judge Advo-
cate General's Conference, Charlottesville, Vir., July 16, 1969.
105 S. 1266, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
106 See note 9 supra.
107 McBride, Towards a Pbemonology of Internation7al Justice, in LAW, REASON, &
JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (G. Hughes ed. 1969).
CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
practices no longer accord with the fundamental logic of a military
criminal law system in our democracy today. There is serious doubt
whether such features of the military justice system as command con-
trol, all-officer juries, and limited appeals serve any useful disciplinary
purpose in our modern military. On the contrary, there is evidence that
such non-judicial practices foster arbitrariness and injustice which un-
dermine morale and discipline.
It is not easy to fashion a military criminal law system which can
operate with fairness and impartiality yet preserve traditional military
discipline and obedience. The reform bills are compromises which
propose a few badly needed structural alterations, but do not attempt
to alter the basic military structure of the court martial itself. Nor do
they address the basic defects in the traditional military approaches to
servicemen's free speech rights, the methods used for training and dis-
cipline of troops, and the demands of conformity and obedience. How-
ever, these bills do offer a number of workable proposals for removing
basic defects in the system. While they will undoubtedly be subjected
to much more refining before military justice reform is a reality, they
promise concrete steps toward improvement of military justice in the
foreseeable future.
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